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Innovation in Ill-Structured Decision-Making by Teams: Contributions of what members say and
don’t say and how they are related
ABSTRACT
The contributions of both types of information that are exchanged and coaction in silence to
innovation objectives of decision-making teams are considered. Ideation and idea generation
are recognized as critical to innovation in decisions that are ill structured. We focus on coaction
in silence and the conditions in interaction that are likely to facilitate idea generation. Integration
of ideas and evaluations that are likely to contribute most to the quality of decisions are given
explicit forms. Major contentions of the account are examined in experimental data.
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INTRODUCTION
In many well-cited cases, interactive teams have been used as decision-making units in
complex objectives that notably include innovation in new product offerings (e.g. Akhavan,
Hosseini and Abbasi 2016; Karhu, Ritala and Viola 2016; Schmidt, Montoya‐Weiss and Massey
2001). Organizations frequently seek directions for innovation from such teams and commit
substantial resources to the directions that can emerge from their decisions. The category of
decisions that is most often addressed by such teams has been designated as ill structured
(Groenendaal and Helsloot 2016; Simon 1973). Decisions in this category as in new product
design and offerings do not typically have algorithmic or even heuristic solution procedures. In
contrast, the decisions are outcomes of the information that is exchanged in the team. The
discourse to follow will consider processing in information exchange by interactive, decisionmaking teams and implications for managing the processing to further innovation.
IDEATION AND INNOVATION
We begin by noting that when decisions are ill structured, ideation has been well cited as an
initial source of innovation. As will be indicated, the processing in idea generation when
individuals are members of interactive teams may not have been adequately elaborated to
integrate what have learned from the study of individual processing. We will be addressing this
in highlighting the importance of coaction in silence to team objectives in ill-structured decision
making. Our interest in the sections to follow will focus upon the proposed relationship of coacting in silence in a task-directed interactive team to idea generation and the willingness to do
so as an intermediary variable of trust. We will give conceptual forms to the relationships that
we elaborate and report an empirical operationalization to test key aspects of the relationships.
We also recognize that since all ideation does not contribute to decision quality and innovation,
critical evaluation of initiated ideas is essential (e.g. Hao, Ku, Liu, Hu, Bodner, Grabner and Fink
2016). The coordination of these information types has been recognized as important to
performance objectives in team decision-making. The path to decisions in such cases is
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sometimes structured in sequenced formats. For example, practitioner-oriented accounts (e.g.
Dyer and Dyer 2013) have emphasized keeping evaluation separate from ideation in a
sequence of stages. The basis for this procedure has been in observations that evaluation
generally inhibits idea generation (Toubia 2006). Although sensitivities of the process to
conditions that include evaluation have been indicated, questions remain about the capability to
exclude evaluation in interactive teams when variables such as interruptions of dialogue by a
team member and non-verbal behavior are considered (Silver, Troyer and Cohen 2000). We
will propose a basis for alternative procedures to integrate ideation and evaluation for innovation
objectives.
Relationships of What is Said and Not Said to Ideation
A number of managerial accounts have emphasized keeping the dialogue flowing in a team
(i.e., maintaining continuous information exchange to facilitate ideation). In contrast to these
accounts, we will address processing that recognizes the importance of what is not said (here,
intervals of silence) and the conditions under which such intervals are likely to occur and can
contribute to ideation and ultimate goals of innovation in decisions.
Ideation in Interactive Team Decisions
We begin by reiterating that ideation is essential to innovation in ill-structured decisions and has
sensitivities that are only partially understood, as in minimally evaluative conditions. There is
also evidence that so-called “incubation” inherently precedes and facilitates ideation and idea
generation (e.g., Gilhoaly 2016a and b; Hélie and Sun 2010). While some reports suggest
unconscious processing that is unobservable occurs in these periods, there is direct behavioral
evidence of idea-facilitating incubation at individual levels (e.g., Dodds, Ward and Smith 2003).
How this may occur in interactive teams and what the exact conditions that facilitate it remain to
be defined. However, it is clear that incubation typically occurs in intervals of silence. Although
all intervals of silence do not indicate incubation, we will suggest that appropriate conditions
such periods may well presage incubation and idea generation. While most of the work on
incubation that facilitates ideation has been in individuals, we will extend these considerations to
the aggregate of a team when intervals of silence are tracked.
Team Coaction in Silence.
Even if incubation implies uninterrupted internal processing that is most likely to occur in teams
in periods of silence, co-acting in silence may not be normative in task-directed teams. It could,
for example, be considered to reflect “social loafing” (Rutte 2005) or rational agent behavior to
avoid negative evaluation of information they initiate, including ideas. To minimize the first of
these possibilities in teams, we address teams in which members are committed to team
objectives. With respect to the second condition, we will propose a form for a construct of trust
in teams that has been extensively cited (Cheung, Gong, Wang, Zhou and Shi 2016; De Jong,
Dirks and Gillespie 2016; Golembiewski and McConkie 1975; Porter and Lilly 1996) and
suggest conditions on social structure in a team that are likely to facilitate or undermine such
trust.
Relationships between perceived equity in the treatment of members in an aggregate
and trust and commitment have been recognized (Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza 1995;
Wise 2016) and, in turn, related to member satisfaction and team performance (Braun, Peus,
Weisweiler and Frey 2013). However, these conceptualizations have not been in terms of the
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information exchange of teams. In the present application, trust will be defined as confidence
that evaluations will be distributed on a meritorious basis rather than to advance the position or
standing individual members in an aggregate social order. As we will indicate, this is most likely
to occur in teams in which members are perceived to be status equal and least likely to be
assumed in teams in which members are perceived to be status differentiated.
TRUST IN THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF A TASK-DIRECTED INTERACTIVE TEAM
Teams like all aggregates of agents tend to have status organizations that operate tacitly
whether or not there are “agreements” that members will be considered equal in the interaction.
In the information exchange of teams, members acting as agents quickly evidence dual motives.
On one hand, they are motivated to contribute to the team’s objective and this requires giving
and receiving negative evaluations. On the other hand, they recognize that the receipt of
negative evaluations can result in status loss and this is typically also an objective.
Given the above, conditions that are likely to best serve the objectives of the teams can be
conceptualized as taking the form of trust that risking the initiation of original ideas will only
result in objective evaluations, some of which may be negative. However, in teams this is
counter to the tendency to over-evaluate lower status members and under-evaluate higher
status members in status differentiated teams (e.g. Wittenbaum 1998). Such a tendency can be
anticipated to be minimal when members can credibly be considered to approximately be status
equals. This can occur through either information on their capabilities on a relevant task or
removal of all status related information in computer-mediated communication. To represent this
conceptualization of social structure in information exchange, we will propose forms for equity
and trust in terms of sources and targets of information as it relates to innovation objectives in
ill-structured decisions. For a related discussion see Kulangara, Jackson, Jackson, Prater and
Prater (2016)
Dynamics in Team Information Exchange
We next give explicit forms for the foregoing account of ideation as a source of innovation in
team information exchange. We first recognize the dual motive problem a member faces.

J 
N 
 
O 
 
S
Given the choice set  
Where J is an idea.
N is a negative evaluation.
O is other information types that include positive evaluations (p) and data/facts (o).
S is silence or non-response in a defined interval.
As noted, the dual objectives of committed team members are to maximize quality (as in
innovative ideas) in an ill-structured decision and to minimize loss of their own status in social
structure of the aggregate. That is, the jth agent in an n person team faces the objectives of
choosing M in each sequence of information types to max I and min −Δσ where I is the
innovation and σ is relative status.
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The individual as an agent further recognizes “costs” to the initiation of information types in
terms of their standing in the team’s social order. This standing is most likely to be modified by
the receipt of negative evaluation (as weighted by the status distance between the sender and
themselves). For this objective, the individual recognizes that
Pr ( N kj|N jk ¿> Pr ( N kj| J j Σ ¿> N kj|S j Σ > Pr ( N kj|O jk ¿ .
This inequality indicates the inherent tendency when status maintenance is the sole dominant
objective to understand negative evaluations and ideas, and avoid coaction in silence in favor of
sending positive evaluations and neutral data/facts.
Eq.(1) gives a form to a team’s objective in an ill-structured decision that represents the
importance of ideation, conditions on the number of evaluations and the distribution of
evaluations across team members. We propose an innovation (or quality) function in three
parts. The first is the number of ideas. The second is definable number of negative evaluations
to evaluate ideas. The parameter r defines the ratio. (Either too few or too many reduce
quality). The third is an equity condition in which the receipt of evaluations by a member is
maintained roughly proportional to the number of ideas a member initiates.
The first term recognizes the contribution of ideation to innovation where decisions and
problems are ill structured. The second term recognizes that meaningful innovation is increased
by a number of evaluations in proportion to the number of ideas initiated since too few or too
many can under evaluate ideas and can increase the perceived threat to status by team
member.
2
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(1) Q(I)=
Where J and N are previously defined.
The willingness to weight the team objective greater than the objective in own status can be
mediated by a construct of trust that others will do the same. An initial form for such trust can be
offered in terms of perceived equity.

(2)
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where
Ej is the jth member’s judgment of inequity in the group. E = 0 indicates perfect equity
i.e. the absence of inequity
Jj is total ideas
Njk is the number of negative evaluations the jth member receives from the kth member a
time interval
P is the number of positive evaluations the jth member receives from the kth member in
a time interval
 jk
k   j
is the difference in status between the jth and kth member
an2, ap2i, cn, cp are rate constants





Trust can, in turn, be defined as
(3)



Tj  1 E j



1

,

j Tj(0,1)
Where Tj is an index of the level of trust in the jth member, T(0,1)

Within this framework, the managerial task can be conceptualized as guiding the exchange of
information in an ill-structured decision along a well-defined dynamic path defined by the eqs.
(1) to (3) to optimality in decision innovation. The multi-part managerial problem is complex. In
this exposition, we will focus upon the issue of coaction in silence and a condition in which trust
that facilitates commitment to the team objective can be increased. As indicated, coaction in
silence is of particular importance to ideation and innovation if some form of “incubation” is likely
to occur in the intervals of silence. Trust and its dependency on perceived equity have been
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proposed as a condition for coaction in silence to occur and be a source of greater idea
generation.
Equity, in turn, has been related to the distribution of evaluations in a team. The unequal
distribution of resources and information that occurs in status-differentiated aggregates has
been well documented (e.g. Wittenbaum 1998). We hypothesize that all else equal, achieved
equity is more likely to occur in a team in which members are perceived to be status equal than
in one in which there is perceived to be status inequality. In support of the foregoing account, we
report results of an experimental study of information exchange in task directed groups that
operationalizes key variables in our account of indeation and social structure in information
exchange.
IDEA-GENERATION TASK
The idea-generation task was an adaptation of the “Winter Survival Exercise” (Johnson and
Johnson 2012). This exercise is one of a series in which groups are considered to be alone in
hostile environments and must use salvaged items to survive. In an adaptation of this task to the
study of idea generation, the group task is to generate as many ideas as possible for survivalrelated uses of each of several salvaged items. After conducting pretests on eight items, a
subtest of five items: six feet of rope, a newspaper, an extra set of clothing, a 45-caliber pistol,
and a can of shortening was used in the study. The coefficient alpha for the five items as a
composite measure in idea generation in a validation study was .94.
Experimental Facility
. In the face-to-face groups of the first study, members of the four-person groups were randomly
assigned seats around a semicircular table designed so that no member was at the head of the
seating arrangement. With the consent of participants, a remote wall-mounted video camera
recorded all sessions.
Independent Variable: Group Status Distributions
Two group status distributions SD or SU, were created experimentally by the random, nonuniform distribution of a task-relevant status attribute across members. Operationally, this
process involved conveying fictitious “survival ability” scores, using a test based on an
abbreviated version of the “Desert Survival Exercise” (Johnson and Johnson 2012). This
exercise is similar to the “Winter Survival Exercise;” with the location and the survival items
modified to a desert setting. The “test” required subjects to rank 10 items according to their
importance to survival. Fictitious scores on the “test” were used to define a status hierarchy in
the SD condition and a near-equal status distribution in the SU condition.
Members were told their own scores and the distribution of the other three scores in the group,
but not the scores of specific individuals. From this information, a member can infer a relative
position in the group-a minimum condition for activating a status process. In the SD condition,
the distribution of returned scores was 2, 4, 5, 8; 10 was the maximum possible score. In the SU
condition, the distribution was 4, 4, 5, 5. Instructions for both conditions emphasized that good
ideas come from all members and that group performance is best when all members participate.
However, because of its relevance to the group task, the ability attribute remains likely to be
activated in the group’s status organization when members are differentiated.
Dependent Variables

Silver

Innovation in Ill-Structured Decision-Making by
Teams

7
The numbers of ideas and four other types of information (positive and negative evaluations,
data/facts, and questions) and a residual category were calculated from reviews of the
videotapes. Ideas were defined as proposed uses of survival items or procedures that directly or
indirectly contribute to the group’s survival. Positive and negative evaluations were defined as
valenced evaluative judgments of the communicated ideas of other group members. Questions
were defined as interrogatives that sought information. Data/fact messages were defined as
declarative statements about the task.
Coding of Information Sequences
Two coders coded video recordings of the interaction in the sessions for the sequence of
information types. Before coding, video recordings were marked at three-minute intervals with a
computer-generated tone to allow analyses of the results in consecutive periods. 1 Coders
employed a uniform procedure: nine minutes of active coding followed by a two-minute rest
period. The more experienced coder scored all records of interaction; to assess reliability, the
second coder coded half the groups to estimate reliability. For a sample of 62 three-minute
periods, the intraclass correlation between the numbers of ideas coded in the three-minute
periods by the two coders was .86. Correlations between coders for data/facts, questions, and
negative evaluations were .91, .94, and .82 respectively.
RESULTS
Effects of the Group Status Distribution on Information Exchange
Groups in the SU condition recorded significantly more total uses (i.e., ideas) than groups in the
SD condition. (MSU = 110.92, MSD = 89.37, t (19) = 2.4, p< .05). The possibility that groups in the
SU condition produced more ideas because they talked more in this condition was also
investigated. Only small, non-significant condition differences in total minutes talking (M MD =
25.24, MSU = 26.57, t(19) < 1.0) were found. Means for total ideas adjusted for the covariate of
minutes talking continued to show large differences although they became only marginally
significant (t (19) = 1.7, p < .10).
Groups in the SU condition exchanged more positive evaluations (M SU = 70.11, MSD = 51.41)
and questions (MSU = 24.16, MSD = 21.43), but fewer data/fact messages (MSU = 27.12, MSD =
32.24) and negative evaluations (MSU = 9.31, MSD = 11.12) than groups in the SD conditions.
Only the difference in positive evaluations attained significance (t (19) = 2.1, p < .05).
Condition differences in total time interacting were small, and not statistically significant.
(MSD=25.25, MSU=26.57, t (19) <1.0). Differences in word density were also examined.
Repeated-measures ANOVA of time trends in information density (defined as number of words
in 18 consecutive two-minute periods) showed no significant main effects of condition, time
period, or the interaction of these factors.
Condition differences in the minutes coacting in silence by conditions were, however, significant
(MSD=14.86, MSU=20.43, t(19) = 2.6, p<.02). Groups in the SD condition spent .37 of their
interaction time in silence compared with .45 of this time by groups in the SU condition. Across
both conditions, a significant correlation between time in silence and number of ideas was
indicated (r= .530, p<.02). When condition differences in the number of ideas were adjusted for

1 On- and off-times of individual group members by reviewing a video of the interactive
group sessions were also coded. In instances of simultaneous talking each of the members
received credit for the time in the individual-level analyses.
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the covariate of minutes in silence, the differences were no longer statistically significant
(t(19)=<1.0).
The order of time spent talking in SD groups corresponded to the three status levels. As
anticipated, group members designated high-status talked more seconds than those designated
as low-status (MHS=334.4, MMS=316.6, MLS=278.1). The differences between high and low status
members were marginally significant (t(9)=2.71, p<.075) Pairwise contrasts of condition
differences in the time talking of middle status members were not significant.
Time Trends in Information Exchange and Coaction in Silence in Group Interaction
In a repeated-measures ANOVA for time spent talking over the first nine three-minute periods
(the maximum number of minutes during which all groups continued the task), significant
differences in time talking by condition (F(1, 19) = 13.92, p < .00l), a significant overall time
trend toward increased talking (F(8, 146) = 3.83, p < .0l), and an interaction of time with
condition (F(8, 146) = 4.14, p < .0l) were indicated. Figure 1 presents these results graphically.
The figure shows that after the first three periods, groups in the SD condition spent more time
talking than groups in the SU condition. Since these groups do not have an interaction history,
the initial periods may be used for orientation and organization. Differences increased over time:
i.e., as time in interaction increased, SD groups increased their time talking, while SU groups
decreased their time talking and increased their time in silence.

Conceptual bases to study condition differences in silence intervals that relate to idea
generation have been previously reviewed. The next section will report methodology in
analyzing this relationship and the results of the analyses.
Silence as a Discrete Time Event
Data from the 20 groups in the study evidenced an increased time in interaction (M SD =31.14,
MSU =29.82 n.s.) and were coded for intervals of silence as discrete events of at least five
seconds and the sequence in information exchange that followed these events. Exemplary time
sequences in information types and silence intervals for ten groups are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Sequence of Information Types in Ten Groups

Table 1 reports counts of the information types that followed a silence event for each group.
First and second order Markov models were then estimated in the data for the sequencing of
information types that followed a silence event for each of the twenty groups in the study. The
2

first order model was found to be a good fit to sI sequence (  (16) 32, p  .01) for all but
one of the groups. The null could not be rejected for more than five of the second order models,
s→I→P and s→I→I and this model was not analyzed further.
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Table 1
First Order Markov Model of Information Following a Five Second Silence Interval
Information Types
Cond

Group

SU
SU
SU
SU
SU
SU
SU
SU
SU
SU
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

I

P

N

D/Q

O

TOTAL

131
86
120
156
67
102
76
148
151
66
66
69
104
112
101
103
66
106
95
68

115
69
74
92
51
88
33
102
47
27
43
55
58
68
48
86
27
42
50
33

5
7
1
9
1
4
18
3
15
8
3
10
11
10
7
13
3
26
12
8

86
30
50
91
41
48
45
35
45
34
21
60
31
50
31
89
43
78
67
20

8
9
7
8
5
5
6
4
4
3
5
8
7
10
6
6
5
5
6
4

345
201
252
356
165
247
178
292
262
138
138
202
211
250
243
297
144
257
224
133

X2
(df=16)
97.712
45.092
35.041
115.249
70.018
54.410
43.817
63.716
38.170
29.401
42.211
52.581
61.408
69.428
63.731
86.092
39.318
59.771
47.866
37.836

Ideas were indicated to be most likely to follow a silence event in both conditions but
significantly more likely to do so in the SU condition (t(19)=2.62, p<.05). In contrast, data
messages were more likely to follow a silence event in the SD condition than in the SU
condition. This difference was marginally significant (t(19) = 1.7, p<.10). In both conditions, there
were significantly more positive evaluations and data messages than ideas. A significant
difference between conditions in the type of information that preceded a silence event was not
found. The discrete event coding was used to calculate SD and SU differences in the
conditional probabilities of information types following a period of silence. These differences are
reported in Table 2. In the analysis of groups with zero interaction histories, negative evaluations
were infrequent as events following a silence interval and were included in the combined
category of other.

Table 2
Conditional Probabilities of Information Types Following a Silence Event
Condition
pr(Is)
pr(ps)
pr(Fs)
pr(oths)
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SD

.463

.009

.172

.365

SU

.590

.021

.104

.285

I = idea; p = positive evaluation; F = data/fact; oth = other type; s = silence
Results in Table 2 further support the predicted condition differences in the conditional
probability of an idea following an interval of silence equal or greater than five seconds. Groups
in the SD condition had lower conditional probabilities of initiating an idea following a silence
interval than groups in the SU condition. In contrast, groups in the SD condition had high
conditional probabilities of initiating facts or other message types than groups in the SU
condition.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The common enfranchisement of teams to make ill-structured decisions in organizations and the
contributions that these decisions can make to innovation in cases such as new product
offerings has been noted. As recognized, ideation is a critical contributor to innovation in illstructured decisions. We have proposed that our understanding of processing in ideation of
individuals has not been well integrated in the processing of teams and that further integration
suggests the increased importance of coaction in silence to team objectives in ill-structured
decisions. Evaluations have been recognized as coordinate contributors to innovation since they
are essential to filtering ideas on quality criteria. However, the coordination of these information
types remains an issue. Influential perspectives have observed that ideation is sensitive to
conditions under which it occurs.
Prescriptive accounts that follow from this latter observation have emphasized
sequential separation of evaluation from ideation. However, there is evidence that evaluation is
common-even if tacit-in interactions that have been defined to be evaluation-free. This has been
documenting as occurring through body language including facial expression and intonation,
most notably by higher status team members.
We have proposed that rather than proscribing evaluations or requiring that they be
deferred, evaluations should be maintained in bounded ratios to idea since too few can under
evaluate ideas and too many can establish what we have designated as negative “socioemotional climates” (Kozlowski, S. W., & Ilgen 2006 ;Pirola-Merlo, Härtel, Mann and Hirst 2002)
that can undermine idea generation. Additionally, it is important that evaluations be distributed
across members in rough proportion to the number of ideas they generate rather than the status
of team members.
To state the focus of the discourse concisely, our attention has been directed to what is
not said as well as what is said in the interaction of teams making ill-structured decisions. We
recognize a literature that has emphasized the importance of incubation to ideation and more or
less solitary conditions under which this typically occurs. We suggest that in teams this
commonly implies coaction in silence. For this to occur requires that team members “trust” that
doing so does not risk evaluation for “social-loafing” or non-participation. From this perspective,
information exchange of teams with greater numbers and more uncommon ideas is likely to
include increased silence intervals. A pre-condition of the kind of “trust” that facilitates coaction
in silence has been hypothesized to be in the distribution of status in the team that members
perceive. Status equal teams are considered to have increased trust in the equitable distribution
of evaluations.
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The relationships that have been elaborated were given a form in an experimental
design to test predictions they offer. A trust condition was approximated by a procedure in which
members are given information that indicates they are status equals in task-relevant
capabilities. In a contrasting condition that is hypothesized to generate lower “trust”, task
relevant information was designed to imply significant inequality in task-relevant capabilities and
thereby, status. Groups in both conditions then completed an idea generation task that with their
permission was videotaped.
Coding of the tapes designated time intervals of active information exchange and coaction in
silence. Analyses showed that although teams in different conditions did not differ significantly in
total time interactions, status equal teams spent more time co-acting in silence and generated
significantly more ideas than status-unequal teams. The sequencing of intervals of silence and
idea initiation was directly examined in Markov models. A first order Markov was found to be a
good fit to the model and indicated that ideas predominated in the sequencing of information
types following an interval of silence. Calculation of the conditional likelihoods of information
type following an interval of silence provided a metric in support of the silence-idea sequence
and hypothesized differences between experimental conditions.
Results on the evidenced sensitivity of idea generation to coaction in silence and the
interaction of this relationship with the implied status distribution on a task relevant attribute as a
hypothesized antecedent of trust support principal contentions of the discourse. In managerial
implications, there are that (1) intervals of coaction in silence in conjunction with a now wellcited construct of trust in an information exchange may have not well-recognized relationships
to team performance and (2) there are managerial alternatives to the mandate that evaluation
be proscribed during idea generation (or entirely).
For (1), the importance of coaction in silence encourages methodology to ensure that
member difference in what are perceived to be status characteristics do not result in strong
structural distributions in the team and undermine the legitimacy of coaction in silence to team
members. In the absence of appropriate conditioning, it is often assumed that “appropriate”
work requires maximizing overt dialogue in the team.
For (2), if evaluation occurs and is communicated tacitly, then nominal proscription of
this information type will be unlikely to facilitate the team objective. Instead bounding the
initiation of negative evaluations a ratio to generated ideas and the condition that distribution
across members is closely related to the distribution of idea generation rather than the
distribution of status may be better prescriptions for managing possible inhibition of idea
generation from excessive or misdirected negative evaluations. GDSSs and IDSSs in computermediated information exchange (ref) evidence capabilities to calculate the ratio between
information types and the distributions of evaluations across members in real-time. While the
managerial task to maintain the maximizing conditions we have proposed are challenging to put
in place in face-to-face interaction, computer-based management capabilities to accomplish this
are increasingly available. As these capabilities continue to advance, increasing definitive
conceptualizations of processing in interactive teams can give direction to design for managing
innovation in cases of ill-structured decision-making by teams.
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